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UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTIONS REGARDING
THE INEVITABLE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN CUBA
Dr. Max G. Manwaring

Four uncomfortable questions arise, even in circumspect circles, regarding the
possible succession of power in Cuba. First, assuming the nearly 80-year old Fidel
Castro is mortal, “Who will succeed him when he dies?” Second, “What role will the
Cuban armed forces play in the transition process?” Third, “What could happen to
disrupt that process?” And, finally, “Will the United States respond to the event in an
ad hoc manner, or will a plan be in place to help ensure U.S. interests?”
The answers to the first two questions are relatively easy, and constitute the most
likely “business as usual” transition scenario. That is, Raul Castro will follow his
brother in an orderly, dynastic succession with the support of a united military chain of
command. Raul has a strong claim to that succession. As already indicated, he is Fidel’s
brother and heir apparent. Significantly, Raul is also the long-time Cuban Defense
Minister, and has considerable military power at his disposal. In this connection, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [FAR]) has long been
the most powerful, influential, and competent governmental institution in Cuba. Top
generals will play crucial roles in all conceivable succession scenarios. So, what could go
wrong?
Several scenarios could be developed, but, for the purposes of this argument, we
will consider the two most discussed possibilities. First, if large-scale internal popular
violence—exacerbated by anti-regime forces outside Cuba—were to be mobilized, it is
possible that some military commanders might refuse to move against civilians. Second,
if Raul Castro were to die before his older brother, the expected succession would be
thrown into chaos. In both these scenarios, (1) institutional integrity—military
command and control—could be fractured and a certain level of anarchy would be
encouraged; (2) various individuals with viable political and/or military power at their
disposal could and would challenge the system, and the best organized and best armed
leader would dominate a praetorian-type regime; and (3) there is a high probability of
civil war.
What, then, should U.S. planners and leaders focus on that would be most helpful in
proactively preparing for or reacting ad hoc to a situation involving the demise or
incapacitation of either Fidel or Raul Castro? The critical dependent variable in these
and many other transition scenarios that might be developed is the degree to which the
institutional integrity of the FAR is being enhanced—or being eroded. FAR's integrity,
in turn, will be determined by the cohesion, singularity of purpose, professionalism,
popular support, and morale of its personnel—and by the political and leadership skills

of the officer corps. Is the United States researching, monitoring, and molding these
variables to provide maximum leverage for the protection and enhancement of U.S.
interests in Cuba and the Caribbean region? Are the additional dependent and
independent variables that contribute significantly to the greater notion of the political,
economic, and social stability and security of Cuba being assessed? Are the same things
being done not only to prevent Cuba from becoming a failed state, but also to establish
a responsible democratic system in that country that will contribute to the
strengthening of democracy in the region? These questions provide a task outline of
what planners and policymakers must accomplish to respond intelligently and
effectively to Cuba's inevitable transition scenario.
The final question involves planning--more specifically, end-state planning. Although
the United States and other global actors might agree regarding Cuba’s many
interrelated problems, how to deal with them in terms of sequence and priority cannot
be left to “ad-hoc-ery.” In this context, it is time to move beyond a unilateral, crisis
management approach to the Cuban strategic problem as if it were a strategy. A longterm multilateral endgame strategy is required for Cuba in which the United States is a
key player. If the United States is to protect and enhance its interests in Cuba and the
Caribbean region it will be crucial to: (1) gather the information that explains the key
operative variables in the Cuban situation; (2) determine mutually-agreed interests with
other players; (3) establish an integrated multilateral implementing strategy upheld by
transparent, achievable goals that can be used to evaluate progress; and (4) develop the
multilateral organization that can implement a unified strategy. The sooner, the better!

